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THE CONTINUING DEBATE OVER DELAY DAMAGES:
PENNSYLVANIA'S NEW RULE 238
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 7, 1988, after much controversy and debate, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court promulgated' a new Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 238 ("Rule 238") governing delay damages.2 The con-
1. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has the authority to "prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and
the conduct of all courts ... if such rules are consistent with this Constitution
and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant
.... PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
2. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238, effective November 7, 1988,
provides as follows:
(a) (1) At the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking monetary
relief for bodily injury, death or property damage, damages for de-
lay shall be added to the amount of compensatory damages
awarded against each defendant or additional defendant found to
be liable to the plaintiff in the verdict of ajury, in the decision of the
court in a nonjury trial or in the award of arbitrators appointed
under section 7361 of the judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. sec. 7361, and
shall become part of the verdict, decision or award.
(2) Damages for delay shall be awarded for the period of time(i) in an action commenced before August 1, 1989, from the
date the plaintiff first filed a complaint or from a date one
year after the accrual of the cause of action, whichever is
later, up to the date of the award, verdict or decision; or
(ii) in an action commenced on or after August 1, 1989, from
a date one year after the date original process was first
served in the action up to the date of the award, verdict or
decision.
(3) Damages for delay shall be calculated at the rate equal to the
prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Jour-
nal published for each calendar year for which the damages are
awarded, plus one percent, not compounded.
(b) The period of time for which damages for delay shall be calculated
under subdivision (a)(2) shall exclude the period of time, if any,
(1) after which the defendant has made a written offer of (i) settle-
ment in a specified sum with prompt cash payment to the plain-
tiff, or (ii) a structured settlement underwritten by a financially
responsible entity, and continued that offer in effect for at least
ninety days or until commencement of trial, whichever first oc-
curs, which offer was not accepted and the plaintiff did not re-
cover by award, verdict or decision, exclusive of damages for
delay, more than 125 percent of either the specified sum or the
actual cost of the structured settlement plus any cash payment
to the plaintiff; or
(2) during which the plaintiff caused delay of the trial.
(c) Not later than ten days after the verdict or notice of the decision,
the plaintiff may file a written motion requesting damages for delay
and setting forth the computation.
(457)
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troversy surrounding former Rule 238 centered on the constitutionality
of the Rule in light of its alleged inequitable treatment of defendants.
Revised Rule 238 is designed to "inject fairness into the rule and to
balance that fairness with efficient judicial administration."' 3 This article
will focus on whether the new Rule achieves these goals.
II. BACKGROUND
The original version of Rule 2384 was adopted on November 20,
(1) Within ten days after the motion is filed, the defendant may
answer specifying the grounds for opposing the plaintiff's mo-
tion. The averments of the answer shall be deemed denied. If
an issue of fact is raised, the court may, in its discretion, hold a
hearing before entering an appropriate order.
(2) If the defendant does not oppose the motion, the court shall
add the damages for delay to the verdict or decision.
(3) (i) If a motion for post-trial relief has been filed under Rule
227.1 and a motion for delay damages is opposed, a judgment
may not be entered until all motions filed under Rule 227.1
and this rule have been decided.
(ii) If no motion for post-trial relief is filed within the ten-day
period under Rule 227.1 but the defendant opposes the mo-
tion for delay damages, the plaintiff may enter judgment on the
verdict or decision. Thereafter, upon deciding the motion for
damages for delay, the court shall enter judgment for the
amount of the delay damages, if any.
(d) [Text omitted discusses the special procedure for awarding delay
damages in an arbitration hearing.]
(e) This rule shall not apply to
(1) eminent domain proceedings;
(2) actions in which damages for delay are allowable in absence of
this rule.
(f) This rule shall apply to actions pending on or after the effective date
of this rule in which damages for delay have not been determined.
PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1989).
3. Id. explanatory comment at 11.
4. Former Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 provided:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), in an action seeking mone-
tary relief for bodily injury, death or property damage, or any com-
bination thereof, the court or the arbitrators . . .shall
(1) add to the amount of compensatory damages in the award of
the arbitrators, in the verdict of a jury, or in the court's deci-
sion in a nonjury trial, damages for delay at ten (10) percent per
annum, not compounded, which shall become part of the
award, verdict or decision;
(2) compute the damages for delay from the date the plaintifl filed the initial
complaint in the action or from a date one year after the accrual of the
cause of action, whichever is later, up to the date of the award, ver-
dict or decision.
(b) In arbitration under the Act of 1836, the amount of damages for
delay shall not be included in determining whether the amount in
controversy is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.
(c) Except as provided in subdivision (e), damages for delay shall be
added to the award, verdict or decision against all defendants found
liable, no matter when joined in the action.
2
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1978, and became effective on April 15, 1979. The former Rule was
designed to alleviate "the problem of congestion and delay in the dispo-
sition of civil actions for bodily injury, death or property damages" by
providing an "incentive for early settlement."
5
Rule 238 directed a court to add to the plaintiffs compensatory
damages an award of delay damages computed at a rate of ten percent
per year.6 Such damages were to be computed from either the date
plaintiff's complaint was filed or from one year after the cause of action
accrued (whichever was later) up to the date of the verdict. 7
In effect, an award of delay damages under former Rule 238 was
(d) The court may, and on request of a party shall, charge the jury that
if it finds for the plaintiff, it shall not award the plaintiff any dam-
ages for delay because this is a matter for the court.
(e) If a defendant at any time prior to trial makes a written offer of
settlement in a specified sum with prompt cash payment to the
plaintiff, and continues that offer in effect until commencement of
trial, but the offer is not accepted and the plaintiff does not recover
by award, verdict or decision, exclusive of damages for delay, more
than 125 percent of the offer, the court or the arbitrators shall not
award damages for delay for the period after the date the offer was
made.
(f) [Text omitted discusses date from which damages are to be com-
puted when the action is pending on the Rule's effective date.]
(g) This rule shall not apply to
(1) eminent domain proceedings:
(2) pending actions in which damages for delay are allowable in
the absence of this rule.
PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987) (emphasis added).
5. 8 Pa. Bull. 2668 (1978). The explanatory comments to Rule 238 were
submitted to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by the Civil Procedural Rules
Committee (the "Committee") along with proposed Rule 238. The Committee
noted that compulsory arbitration laws had helped to speed-up the disposition
of smaller civil actions (i.e., cases under $10,000 in Philadelphia and Allegheny
counties, and under $5,000 in other counties). Id. However, there was no simi-
lar mechanism to reduce delay in larger civil actions. Id. After reviewing statisti-
cal surveys, the Committee determined that "in too many cases meaningful
negotiations commence only after a trial date is fixed or on the courthouse steps
.... Id. In addition to promoting settlements, the Committee felt that the
Rule provided a necessary means for both compensating plaintiffs and penaliz-
ing defendants for long delays between commencement of an action and trial.
Id.
Although the explanatory comments were not explicitly adopted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, they are useful in "disclos[ing] the problems
[that] the Rule was designed to alleviate.". Berry v. Anderson, 348 Pa. Super.
618, 623, 502 A.2d 717, 720 (1986).
6. For the relevant text of former Rule 238(a)(1), see supra note 4. Punitive
damages are not to be included in plaintiff's judgment when calculating delay
damages. Colodonato v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 504 Pa. 80, 86, 470 A.2d 475,
478 (1983).
For purposes of this article, Rule 238 will be discussed only in the context of
civil actions tried before a judge or jury. However, the Rule also applies in arbi-
tration hearings. For the relevant text of new Rule 238(a)(1), see supra note 2.
7. For the relevant text of former Rule 238(a)(2), see supra note 4.
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equivalent to an award of pre-judgment interest.8 However, former
Rule 238 contained a special provision that protected the defendant
from the imposition of delay damages if (1) the defendant submitted a
written settlement offer prior to trial and kept the offer open until com-
mencement of trial, (2) the plaintiff rejected defendant's offer, and (3)
the plaintiff's verdict was not more than 125% of the defendant's offer. 9
If the above conditions were met, the court could not assess delay dam-
ages for the time period after the defendant submitted his offer. 10
Therefore, under former Rule 238, it was in the defendant's best inter-
ests to submit a "reasonable" and timely settlement offer in order to
reduce the amount of delay damages in the event of an unsuccessful
verdict at trial. ''.
The constitutionality of former Rule 238 was first challenged in
Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County12 on the following two
grounds: (1) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had exceeded its rulemak-
ing authority by promulgating a Rule affecting litigants' substantive
rights, and (2) the Rule violated the requirements of due process and
equal protection under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitu-
tions.' 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld former Rule 238
against these objections. 14 With regard to the first objection, the court
found that Rule 238's main purpose was "to alleviate delay in the dispo-
sition of cases, thereby lessening congestion in the courts."' 15 There-
fore, the Rule's promulgation fell within the supreme court's
constitutional authority to regulate the administration ofjustice in state
courts. 16 The court reasoned that it had the authority to promulgate
8. See generally Note, Automatic Assessment of Delay Damages Suspended - Craig v.
Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 389, 399-404 (1987)
(history of delay damages in Pennsylvania); see also Dale v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
520 Pa. 96, 107, 552 A.2d 1037, 1042 (1989) (new Rule 238 damages referred to
as "pre-judgment interest damages"). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
modeled Rule 238 after the New Jersey rule which automatically added pre-
judgment interest at a rate of 12% per annum (for periods prior to January 1,
1988) to all judgments in tort actions. Insurance Fed'n v. Supreme Court, 669
F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1982); see N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:42-11(b). However, unlike
Rule 238, the NewJersey rule did not per'nit defendants to avoid the imposition
of pre-judgment interest by submitting a reasonable settlement offer. See id.
9. For the relevant text of former Rule 238(e), see supra note 4.
10. Id.
11. See Berry v. Anderson, 348 Pa. Super. 618, 623, 502 A.2d 717, 720
(1986).
12. 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bucheit v.
Laudenberger, 456 U.S. 940 (1982).
13. Id. at 55, 436 A.2d at 149.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 59, 436 A.2d at 151. The court stated that the purpose of the
Rule had to be determined before the Rule could be characterized as substantive
or procedural. Id. at 58, 436 A.2d at 150.
16. Id. at 67, 436 A.2d at 155. Moreover, the court held that Rule 238 ful-
[Vol. 35: p. 457
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Rule 238 because the Rule was primarily procedural in nature, 17 even
though the Rule had a "collateral effect on a substantive right.' 8 Rule
238's award of pre-judgment interest had the effect of enlarging a plain-
tiff's substantive rights, thereby abridging a defendant's rights.19 How-
ever, the court held that it could not invalidate a judical rule merely
because it touched on substantive rights, because to do so would seri-
ously hamper the court's ability to perform its duties. 20 Furthermore,
instead of being viewed as creating a new substantive right, delay dam-
ages could be viewed as merely "an extension of the compensatory dam-
ages necessary to make a plaintiff whole."'2 ' Under this rationale, delay
damages merely compensate a plaintiff for the inability to use funds dur-
ing the pendency of the litigation. 22
filled the supreme court's duty to the public to "effectuate prompt, expeditious
trial and settlement of cases." Id. at 61, 436 A.2d at 152.
17. Id. at 55-67, 436 A.2d at 149-55. For the relevant text of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution authorizing the supreme court to pass procedural rules,
see supra note 1.
The Laudenberger court recognized that in the majority of states with pre-
judgment interest rules, these rules were passed by the legislatures, thereby im-
plying that the rules constituted substantive law. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 63, 436
A.2d at 153. However, instead of addressing the reasoning of these states, the
court focused on New Jersey, the only state with a pre-judgment interest rule
promulgated by the state supreme court. Id. at 63-64, 436 A.2d at 153. For a
discussion of the New Jersey rule, see supra note 8. The court noted that the
New Jersey rule had withstood a similar constitutional challenge. Laudenberger,
496 Pa. at 64, 436 A.2d at 153 (citing Busik v. Levine, 63 NJ. 351, 359-60, 307
A.2d 571, 576, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973)). The court found Busik
particularly relevant because the supreme courts in New Jersey and Pennsylvania
have substantially the same rule-making authority. Id., 436 A.2d at 154. Fur-
thermore, in the court's opinion, the New Jersey rule was more substantive in
nature than Rule 238 because it mandated an award of interest to all successful
plaintiffs in tort actions, regardless of whether the defendant had submitted a
settlement offer. Id. at 59-60, 436 A.2d at 151. Because the New Jersey rule
provided no incentive for litigants to settle early, it lacked the essential proce-
dural aspect of Rule 238. Id.
18. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 67, 436 A.2d at 155. The court acknowledged
that "Rule 238 embodies both procedural and substantive elements." Id. at 66,
436 A.2d at 155.
19. Id. at 65-66, 436 A.2d at 154-55.
20. Id. at 66-67, 436 A.2d at 155.
21. Id. at 66, 436 A.2d at 154.
22. Id. at 65-66, 436 A.2d at 154.
Following Laudenberger the Third Circuit held that under the Erie doctrine
former Rule 238 was substantive in nature and, therefore, had to be applied by
the federal district courts in diversity actions. Jarvis v. Johnson,(668 F.2d 740
(3d Cir. 1982); see generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (estab-
lished broad policies for determining when state law should apply in federal di-
versity actions). The Third Circuit noted that for purposes of determining
whether to apply state law in federal courts, the state's characterization of a rule
as "substantive" or "procedural" was not controlling. Jarvis, 668 F.2d at 745,
747-48. Instead, the Third Circuit's decision to apply Rule 238 was based on the
fact that application of the Rule was "outcome-determinative"; therefore, a fail-
ure to apply the Rule would subvert the intent of Erie by promoting "forum-
1990]
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With regard to the second objection, the court held that former
Rule 238 did not violate equal protection requirements. 23 The court
found that plaintiffs and defendants are not "similarly situated" 24 and,
therefore, distinctions could be drawn between the two so long as they
were "reasonably justified., 25 The court reasoned that plaintiffs and de-
fendants are not "similarly situated" because plaintiffs enter a lawsuit
having already suffered an injury or loss allegedly caused by defendants'
actions. 2 6 A delay in settlement of the case causes plaintiffs additional
harm by preventing prompt compensation. 2 7 On the other hand, the
defendants, who have not suffered any loss, are able to earn interest on
the money used to compensate the plaintiffs and are able to otherwise
benefit from delays in the lawsuit.28
Rule 238 distinguished between plaintiffs and defendants by pun-
ishing only defendants for delays. 29 However, the court found this dis-
tinction constitutional because it bore a "fair and substantial relation"
to the goal of encouraging defendants to settle worthy claims as expedi-
tiously as possible.3 0 Finally, the court held that former Rule 238 met
the requirements of substantive due process. As with equal protection,
the touchstone of substantive due process is whether the law in question
is rationally related to a legitimate state goal, and the court had already
found that the Rule "serve[d] the purpose for which it was
promulgated." 3 3
shopping." Id. at 745-46; see generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)
(discussion of policy against "forum-shopping"); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945) (discussion of "outcome-determinative" test). Recently, the
Third Circuit decided that new Rule 238 must be applied in federal diversity
actions for the reasons stated inJarvis. Fauber v. KEM Transp. & Equip. Co.,
876 F.2d 327, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1989).
23. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 69, 436 A.2d at 156. The court addressed ap-
pellees' equal protection arguments under the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions concurrently, as the two equal protection clauses were "suffi-
ciently similar to warrant like treatment." Id. at 67 n.13, 436 A.2d at 155 n.13
(citing Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Labor & Indus., 461 Pa.
68, 83, 334 A.2d 636, 643 (1975)). In order to meet equal protection require-
ments, "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.'" Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)); see also Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 68, 436
A.2d at 155.
24. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 68-69, 436 A.2d at 156.
25. Id. at 68, 436 A.2d at 155.
26. Id. at 68-69, 436 A.2d at 156.
27. Id. at 69, 436 A.2d at 156.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 68, 436 A.2d at 156.
30. Id. at 69, 436 A.2d at 156.
31. Id. at 70, 436 A.2d at 157. Substantive due process requires the follow-
ing: "[A] law which purports to be an exercise of the police power must not be
unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case,
462 [Vol. 35: p. 457
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In contrast to the majority's interpretation, Justice Roberts, in his
dissent, argued that "Rule 238 imposes arbitrary, unreasonable, and un-
equal burdens in the absence of tangible evidence that such measures
will serve to accomplish the Rule's intended purpose of eliminating de-
lay." '3 2 Specifically, Justice Roberts identified three ways in which for-
mer Rule 238 punished defendants unfairly.3 3  First, Rule 238
automatically imposed delay damages without any consideration of a de-
fendant's good faith. 3 4 Second, the amount of delay damages awarded
could depend upon when the plaintiff filed the complaint, a factor com-
pletely beyond the defendant's control.3 5 For example, if the plaintiff
filed the complaint at the time the cause of aiction accrued, interest
would not start running until one year later.36 As a result, the defend-
ant would have one year to review the merits of the case and prepare an
appropriate offer without having to worry about delay damages.3 7 On
the other hand, the plaintiff could maximize the potential award of delay
damages by waiting and filing the complaint one year after the cause of
action accrued.3 8 In this situation, the defendant would be forced to
immediately assess the case and submit a settlement offer to prevent
pre-judgment interest from running.3 9
Finally, Justice Roberts stated that former Rule 238 was unfair in
that it only punished defendants. 40 Justice Roberts suggested that Rule
238 "should not only require defendants to make reasonable settlement
offers, but also should require plaintiffs to make reasonable de-
and the means which it employs must have a real and substantial relation to the
objects sought to be attained." Id., 436 A.2d at 156 (quoting Gambone v. Com-
monwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 551, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (1954)).
32. Id. at 77, 436 A.2d at 160 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts also
believed that the supreme court had exceeded its procedural rule-making au-
thority by promulgating Rule 238. Id. at 71-78, 436 A.2d at 157-61 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
33. Id. at 77-78, 436 A.2d at 160 (Roberts, J., dissenting); see Lebowitz, A
Remedy for Rule 238, 26 DuQ. L. REV. 531, 540-42 (1988).
34. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 77, 463 A.2d at 160 (Roberts,J, dissenting). To
illustrate this problem, Justice Roberts described how a defendant, acting in bad
faith, could deliberately submit a low settlement offer yet be fortunate enough to
avoid the imposition of delay damages because the jury came in with a low ver-
dict (i.e., a verdict that was less than 125% of defendant's offer). Id. (Roberts,J.,
dissenting). However, another defendant, acting in good faith, could submit a
reasonable offer yet be punished because the jury happened to come in with a
high verdict. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
35. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). Under former Rule 238, delay damages
were assessed either from the date the complaint was filed or from one year after
the cause of action accrued, whichever was later. For the relevant text of former
Rule 238(a)(2), see supra note 4.
39. Laudenberger, 496 Pa. at 77, 463 A.2d at 160 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 78, 436 A.2d at 160 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
4631990]
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mands. ' '4 1 Justice Roberts concluded that Rule 238 would better
achieve its goal of promoting early settlements if both parties were sanc-
tioned for acting unreasonably. 4 2
Five years later, in Craig v. Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center,43 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reconsidered its holding in Laudenberger
and suspended the mandatory imposition of delay damages against a
defendant regardless of fault. 4 4 The Laudenberger court assumed that de-
fendants always prolonged lawsuits because they profited from delays. 45
If this assumption were true, the automatic imposition of delay damages
against a defendant would always be fair punishment.4 6 However, in
Craig the court was confronted with a situation where the plainti f, not the
defendant, caused delays during the lawsuit. 4 7
The court began its review of Rule 238 by noting that "[the Rule]
was a bold experiment that seemed reasonable, salutary and equitable"
41. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
43. 512 Pa. 60, 515 A.2d 1350 (1986).
44. Id. at 65, 515 A.2d at 1353. In Craig the court was faced with the same
constitutional challenges addressed in Laudenberger. Id. at 64, 515 A.2d at 1352.
For a discussion of these constitutional arguments, see supra notes 12-27 and
accompanying text. Justice Hutchinson, in his concurring opinion in Craig, dis-
agreed with the court's characterization of Rule 238 as procedural. Craig, 512
Pa. at 66-69, 515 A.2d at 1354-55 (Hutchinson,J., concurring). In his opinion, a
general rule on delay damages should be left to the legislature, and the courts
should confine themselves to providing relief on a case by case basis. Id. at 67-
68, 515 A.2d at 1354 (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
45. Craig, 512 Pa. at 64, 515 A.2d at 1352. The Craig court realized that
"Rule 238 ha[d] become an uncontestable presumption that all fault lies with a
defendant." Id. at 65, 515 A.2d at 1353. Justice Larsen felt that the majority's
preoccupation with the issue of fault was misplaced. Id. at 70, 515 A.2d at 1356
(Larsen,J., dissenting). Under his interpretation of Rule 238, a defendant could
always protect himself from the imposition of delay damages by submitting a
reasonable settlement offer in a timely fashion. Id. at 70, 515 A.2d at 1355 (Lar-
sen, J., dissenting). This protection would exist regardless of whether the de-
fendant was at fault for causing delays. Id. at 70-71, 515 A.2d at 1356 (Larsen,
J., dissenting). In his opinion, an award of delay damages was not intended to
punish the defendant, instead, it was intended to fully compensate the plaintiff.
Id. at 71, 515 A.2d at 1356 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 64, 515 A.2d at 1352.
47. Id., 515 A.2d at 1353. In May 1974 Mrs. Craig sustained a burn at
Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center ("Magee") while undergoing treatment
for a decubitus ulcer on her leg. Id. at 63, 515 A.2d at 1352. In April 1976 Mrs.
Craig brought an action against Magee and the doctor in charge of her treat-
ment. Id. The case came to trial in December 1980 but, due to a mistrial, the
case was not tried to completion until January 1983. Id. The jury found only
Magee liable and awarded $50,000 to Mrs. Craig. Id. at 62, 515 A.2d at 1351.
Magee's best settlement offer had been $25,000. Id. at 63 n.2, 515 A.2d at 1352
n.2. Because the verdict amount ($50,000) exceeded the settlement offer
($25,000) by more than 25%, the court awarded delay damages in the amount of
$16,450. Id. at 63, 515 A.2d at 1352. However, in reviewing the pre-trial rec-
ord, it appeared that Mrs. Craig had been responsible for many of the post-
ponements and continuances during pendency of the lawsuit. Id.
[Vol. 35: p. 457
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at the time it was adopted. 48 However, when faced with the Craig facts,
the court recognized that Rule 238 could operate inequitably by penal-
izing the defendant without first providing a "forum to assess fault." 4 9
To solve this inequity, the court suspended the mandatory provi-
sions of Rule 238 and instituted procedures for a post-judgment hearing
to assess fault. 50 In determining whether to impose delay damages, the
court directed judges to consider, with regard to each party, the follow-
ing factors: (1) requests for continuances, (2) cooperation during discov-
ery and (3) responsibility for delays caused by the joinder of additional
parties. 5 1 Therefore, the judge would have to look at more than just the
length of time between commencement of the action and the trial ver-
dict. 52 The court then directed the Civil Procedural Rules Committee to
begin discussions on how to amend Rule 238 in accordance with the
Craig opinion. 53
On November 7, 1988, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted
the amendments to Rule 238 written by the Civil Procedural Rules Com-
mittee pursuant to the Craig decision. 54 In the explanatory comment to
revised Rule 238, the drafters noted that the Laudnberger court estab-
lished two purposes for the original Rule: (1) to reduce congestion in
the courts, and (2) to motivate defendants to settle worthy claims as ex-
48. Id. at 64, 515 A.2d at 1352. The Rule was "reasonable" because it at-
tempted to reduce delays in the settlement of tort actions; it was "salutary" be-
cause it penalized defendants for profiting from delays; and it was "equitable"
because it compensated plaintiffs for the delay in receiving funds that were right-
fully owed. Id.
49. Id. at 65, 515 A.2d at 1353. In Justice Larsen's opinion, "merely be-
cause the facts in this case are different ... is [an] insufficient reason to suspend
the operation of Rule 238 ..... Id. at 72, 515 A.2d at 1357 (Larsen, J.,
dissenting).
50. Id. at 65-66, 515 A.2d at 1353. By denying the right to a hearing on the
issue of fault, the Craig court felt that the Rule "r[a]n too tight a gauntlet
through Due Process ...." Id. at 65, 515 A.2d at 1353.
Under the new procedures, a plaintiff seeking delay damages would have to
file a motion within five days after the verdict. Id. The defendant's answer
would be due within five days after the filing of the plaintiff's motion. Id. If any
factual disputes existed, the judge could hold a hearing before making his deter-
mination. Id. Injustice Larsen's opinion this post-trial hearing was "unneces-
sary and burdensome." Id. at 73, 515 A.2d at 1357 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, it defeated the primary purpose of Rule 238 by prolonging litiga-
tion. Id. (Larsen, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 66, 515 A.2d at 1353. These factors were not intended to be ex-
clusive as the court alluded to "other pertinent factors" that might be consid-
ered. Id.
52. Id. The court held that the new procedures would only have a prospec-
tive effect. Id. With regard to pending cases, the new procedures would only
apply if the issue of delay damages had been preserved. Id.
53. Id. For the relevant text of former Rule 238, see supra note 4.
54. For a discussion of the adoption of new Rule 238 and the text of new
Rule 238, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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peditiously as possible. 55 Subsequently, the Craig court "introduced the
concept of fault" and the defendant's right to a hearing. 56 According to
the drafters, revised Rule 238 is designed "to satisfy the goals of both
Laudenberger and Craig."' 57 Therefore, it must encourage defendants to
settle early while also providing a forum to assess fault.
New Rule 238 contains two major changes pursuant to Craig. First,
the new Rule provides procedures, similar to those set forth in Craig,
whereby a defendant may contest a plaintiff's request for delay dam-
ages.5 8 However, the defendant will receive a formal hearing only if the
judge determines that there are disputed issues of fact which warrant
such a hearing. 59 Second, a defendant can prevent delay damages from
being assessed where the plaintiff has caused a delay of the trial. 60 This
provision is specifically addressed to defendants, such as the one in
Craig, who were unjustly penalized under the old rule for delays caused
by plaintiffs. 6 1
Under the new Rule, the defendant can oppose the plaintiff's mo-
tion for delay damages by proving that: (1) the requisite settlement offer
has been made 6 2 or (2) the plaintiff caused a delay of the trial.6 3 If the
defendant establishes these elements,6 4 the court will not assess dam-
ages for any time after the defendant's submission of a settlement offer,
or during any time that the plaintiff was responsible for delays.
55. PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. explanatory comment at 9
(Purdon Supp. 1989).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. For the relevant text of Rule 238(c)(1), see supra note 2. For a discus-
sion of the procedures to be followed under Craig, see supra note 44.
59. For the relevant text of Rule 238(c)(1), see supra note 2. The court has
discretion whether to hold such a hearing. Id.
60. For the relevant text of Rule 238(b)(2), see supra note 2.
61. For a discussion of the holding in Craig, see supra notes 37-47 and ac-
companying text.
62. The new Rule adds a provision which permits the defendant to submit
an offer in the form of a structured settlement. For the relevant text of Rule
238(b)(1)(ii), see supra note 2. However, the court may review the financial ar-
rangements surrounding such an offer before approving it. PA. R. Civ. P. 238,
42 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. explanatory comment at 10 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
63. PA. R. Civ. P. 238(b)(2), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. explanatory comment
at 9 (Purdon Supp. 1989); see Miller v. Wise Business Forms, 381 Pa. Super. 236,
241, 553 A.2d 443, 446 (1989) (en banc). In addition, delay damages will not be
assessed against an indigent defendant if the defendant's settlement offer repre-
sents all that he can afford to pay. Berry v. Anderson, 348 Pa. Super. 618, 627,
502 A.2d 717, 722 (1986). This holding in Berry applies under the new Rule.
PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. explanatory comment at 10 (Purdon
Supp. 1989).
64. PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. explanatory comment at 9
(Purdon Supp. 1989).
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III. ANALYSIS
New Rule 238 corrects the primary flaw in the former Rule by elimi-
nating the mandatory imposition of delay damages, thereby rejecting
the irrebuttable presumption that defendants always cause delays in liti-
gation.6 5 By providing for a discretionary hearing, the new Rule bal-
ances the goals of Craig and Laudenberger. Rule 238's aim of alleviating
congestion in the courts66 is somewhat frustrated because a hearing on
delay damages extends litigation. However, it is necessary to provide
defendants with an opportunity to be heard in order to insure that de-
fendants' due process rights are met. 6 7 Rule 238 balances these oppos-
ing goals by requiring a hearing only when deemed necessary by the
judge.
Although the new Rule provides some relief for defendants, two
main problems still exist: (1) defendants are penalized for delays when
neither party is at fault, and (2) the reasonableness of plaintiffs' conduct
during settlement negotiations is not considered and, therefore, plain-
tiffs are not subject to any sanctions for unreasonable behavior. With
regard to the first criticism, revised Rule 238 partially resolves the issue
of fault by excluding from the damage calculation any delay caused by
the plaintiff.68 However, the Rule fails to address a situation where
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is at fault for causing delays. In
Miller v. Wise Business Forms,6 9 the Pennsylvania Superior Court resolved
this issue by holding that, under revised Rule 238, a defendant may not
exclude the period of time during which neither party is at fault.70 As a
result, a defendant will be penalized for, among other things, delays re-
sulting from administrative inefficiency such as "court calendar
delay." 7 1
65. For a discussion of this problem in Craig, see supra notes 37-43 and ac-
companying text.
66. For a discussion of this purpose, see supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
67. For a discussion of the due process requirements, see supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
68. For the relevant text of Rule 238(b)(2), see supra note 2.
69. 381 Pa. Super. 236, 553 A.2d 443 (1989) (en banc). For a discussion of
the facts in Miller, see infra note 86.
70. Miller, 381 Pa. Super. at 241, 553 A.2d at 446. Because the drafters of
Rule 238 only specified two- circumstances during which the defendant could
avoid the imposition of damages, the court inferred that they must have in-
tended to bar any other exclusions. Id.; see also Hickman v. Fruehauf Corp., 386
Pa. Super. 455, 563 A.2d 155 (1989) (defendant never submitted written offer;
therefore, award of delay damages proper despite stipulation that neither party
caused delay); Snelsire v. Moxon, 384 Pa. Super. 85, 557 A.2d 785 (1989) (en
banc) (same); Sherrill v. Port Auth., 383 Pa. Super. 104, 556 A.2d 450 (1989)
(same). It is important to note that an oral offer of settlement has no effect
under Rule 238. See Miller, 381 Pa. Super. at 240 n.3, 553 A.2d at 445 n.3.
71. Modrick v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 383 Pa. Super. 498, 501, 557 A.2d 363,
364 (1989), overruled on other grounds, King v. SEPTA, 383 Pa. Super. 420, 557
A.2d 11 (1989) (en banc). In this personal injury case, the plaintiff's complaint
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By punishing a defendant regardless of fault, revised Rule 238 op-
erates in a manner contrary to that intended by the supreme court in
Craig. This position was expressed by President Judge Cirillo of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in his dissent in Ceresini v. Valley View Trailer
Park.72 Judge Girillo stated that excluding the time that plaintiffs cause
delays is only a partial solution to the "no-fault" problem as new Rule
238 still operates to punish "defendants qua defendants."17 3 In effect,
Rule 238 "makes defendants culpable for the simple reason that they
have chosen to defend their case." '7 4
Prior to the enactment of new Rule 238, there appeared to be con-
fusion at the trial level on how to resolve this "no-fault" issue under
Craig. Some trial courts interpreted Craig narrowly by holding that it
only intended to prevent defendants from being penalized for delays
caused by plaintiffs. 75 Under this line of reasoning, when neither party
is at fault, it is unfair to deny delay damages because plaintiffs are enti-
tled to receive interest on their mioney which defendants have held dur-
was filed on November 13, 1984. Id. at 500, 557 A.2d at 364. The case was
"placed at issue" (i.e., ready for trial) onJanuary 21, 1985; however, the case was
not put on the trial list until November 1986. Id. at 500-01, 557 A.2d at 364.
The trial began on December 4, 1986, and a verdict for plaintiff was entered on
December 9, 1986 in the amount of $66,000. Id. at 501, 557 A.2d at 364. Fol-
lowing plaintiff's request for delay damages, the trial court awarded delay dam-
ages in the amount of $16,783. Id. On appeal, defendant argued that delay
damages should not have been imposed from January 21, 1985 (the time the
case was initially ready for trial) to December 9, 1986 (the verdict date) because
this delay was due to the trial court's inability to schedule the case any earlier.
Id. at 503, 557 A.2d at 365. The court rejected defendant's argument because
new Rule 238 does not provide an exclusion for administrative delays. Id. at
504, 557 A.2d at 366; see also King v. SEPTA, 383 Pa. Super. 420, 422, 557 A.2d
11, 12-13 (1989) (en banc) (award of delay damages proper even though "delay
in the case was the result of the backlog of cases in the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas"). The severity of this problem with congestion in the courts is
highlighted when one considers that "eight years is the norm between the com-
plaint and verdict in Philadelphia County .... Schrock v. Albert Einstein Medi-
cal Center, 386 Pa. Super. 215, 227, 562 A.2d 875, 881 (1989) (Popovich, J.,
dissenting).
72. 380 Pa. Super. 416, 419-21, 552 A.2d 258, 259-60 (1988) (en banc)(Cirillo, Pres. J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, King v. SEPTA, 383 Pa.
Super. 420, 557 A.2d 11 (1989) (en banc).
73. Id. at 421, 552 A.2d at 260 (Cirillo, Pres. J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Cirillo, Pres. J., dissenting). This argument was also asserted in
Modrick, where the defendant appealed an award of delay damages because the
delay in the litigation was the trial court's fault. Modrick, 383 Pa. Super. at 502,
557 A.2d at 364-65. According to the defendant, assessing delay damages with-
out a showing of fault "violatets] the holding in Craig that liability by mere civil
defendant status is not the law of Pennsylvania and cannot be the basis for
awarding pre-judgment interest. [One] cannot be penalized for being a civil de-
fendant in a court system . I..." d  at 503, 557 A.2d at 365.
75. See, e.g., Schrock v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 386 Pa. Super. 215,
228, 562 A.2d 875, 881 (1989) (Popovich, J., dissenting) (discussion of trial
court's reasoning under Craig); King v. SEPTA, 383 Pa. Super. 420, 422-23, 557
A.2d 11, 12 (1989) (en banc) (same).
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ing pendency of the lawsuit. 76 In such a case delay damages are
intended to fully compensate plaintiffs, not to punish defendants. 77
Other trial courts, however, felt that under Craig delay damages could
only be imposed in those cases where it was proven that the defendant
was at fault. Therefore, in a case where neither party was at fault, the
defendant could not be penalized.7 8
If the supreme court in Craig intended to prevent the assessment of
delay damages only when the plaintiff is at fault, then new Rule 238
achieves this goal.7 9 However, it seems that the court was more con-
cerned with the constitutionality of assessing delay damages against an
innocent defendant, regardless of the cause of the delay. 80 Under the
latter interpretation, revised Rule 238 fails to fully correct the problems
identified in Craig because in certain situations the Rule will punish de-
76. Schrock, 386 Pa. Super. at 228, 562 A.2d at 881 (Popovich,J., dissenting)
(quoting Trial Court Opinion at 6, 7); King, 383 Pa. Super. at 422, 557 A.2d at
12 (quoting Trial Court Opinion at 6). Defendants are not unfairly punished
because they have the ability to protect themselves by promptly submitting a
reasonable settlement offer. King, 383 Pa. Super. at 422-23, 557 A.2d at 12. To
impose delay damages only in cases where it is proven that the defendant pur-
posefully delayed the case would "emasculate Rule 238." Id. at 423, 557 A.2d at
12 (quoting Trial Court Opinion at 7).
77. Schrock, 386 Pa. Super. at 228, 562 A.2d at 881 (Popovich,J., dissenting)
(quoting Trial Court Opnion at 6).
78. For example, in Tindal v. SEPTA, 385 Pa. Super. 94, 560 A.2d 183
(1989) (en banc), the trial court felt that in order to comply with Craig it had to
reduce delay damages by excluding the time during which the judge's stay order
delayed the litigation. Id. at 100, 560 A.2d at 186. According to the trial court,
delay damages could not be assessed during this time because it was an adminis-
trative delay, not caused by either party. Id. Due to the promulgation of new
Rule 238, the superior court reversed and remanded to the trial court for appli-
cation of the new Rule. Id. at 101, 560 A.2d at 187. The superior court also
noted that new Rule 238 does not provide an exclusion for administrative de-
lays. Id. For a discussion of the applicability of new Rule 238 in cases pending
on appeal as of the Rule's effective date, see infra notes 99-107 and accompany-
ing text.
79. In Craig the court noted that the circumstances were unique because it
was the plaintiff who had caused the delay of trial. Craig, 512 Pa. at 64, 515 A.2d
at 1353. For a discussion of the holding in Craig, see supra notes 37-47 and
accompanying text.
80. Craig, 512 Pa. at 65, 515 A.2d at 1353. In Knudsen v. Delaware County
Regional Water Quality Control Auth., 121 Pa. Commw. 549, 551 A.2d 358,
(1988) the court stated:
Although the Craig opinion addresses delays by both parties, its
focus is upon the actions of a defendant in relation to the purposes of
Rule 238. Where it is determined that the defendant has acted to delay
the proceedings, the assessment of delay damages is appropriate. Con-
versely, where a'defendant is not found to be the cause of any delays,
the purposes of Rule 238 are not served and delay damages are
inappropriate.
Id. at 553, 551 A.2d at 360; see also Shellhamer v. Grey, 359 Pa. Super. 499, 505,
519 A.2d 462, 465 (1986) (Court referred to fault as a "condition precedent to
the imposition of Rule 238 delay damages."), appeal denied, 515 Pa. 594, 528
A.2d 603 (1987).
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fendants absent a finding of fault. 8 1
Judge Popovich has come up with a novel solution to the "no-fault"
dilemma by suggesting that new Rule 238 be read in conjunction with
Craig.8 2 Under his view, "the law as composed of both Craig and new
Rule 238 ' 83 would bar the imposition of delay damages where neither
party is at fault because the Rule embodies the holding in Craig.84
The second major criticism of revised Rule 238 is that it fails to
consider the effect of plaintiffs' conduct during settlement negotiations.
In order to avoid the imposition of delay damages, the defendant must
prove that the plaintiff caused a delay of trial.8 5 Not just any procedural
delay will suffice; instead, the defendant must satisfy the difficult burden
of proving that the plaintiff's conduct directly led to a postponement of
trial.8 6
For example, consider a situation where the plaintiff has delayed
litigation by submitting unreasonable settlement demands, thereby pre-
cluding any chance of settling the case. If the plaintiff prevails at trial,
the issue is whether the defendant could avoid the imposition of delay
damages by arguing that the plaintiff was responsible for preventing
early settlement of the case. This issue was recently addressed in Kukow-
ski v. Kukowski, 87 where the trial court refused to award delay damages
because the plaintiff's excessive settlement demands may have pro-
longed resolution of the case.8 8 In Kukowski the plaintiff had requested
damages in the amount of $600,000 and $200,000, both of which
seemed unreasonable in light of the $80,000 verdict at trial.8 9 The su-
81. For a discussion of cases where delay damages have been imposed re-
gardless of fault, see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
82. Snelsire v. Moxon, 384 Pa. Super. 85, 92, 557 A.2d 785, 788 (1989) (en
banc) (Popovich, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting); see also Shrock v. Albert Einstein Medical
Center, 386 Pa. Super. 215, 229, 562 A.2d 875, 881 (1989) (Popovich, J.,
dissenting).
85. For the relevant text of Rule 238(b)(2), see supra note 2.
86. PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. explanatory comment at 10
(Purdon Supp. 1989). According to the comment, delays during discovery (e.g.,
resulting from the failure to answer interrogatories or produce records on time)
are not relevant unless they cause a delay in the trial. Noncompliance during
discovery should be dealt with under Rule 4019, which provides for pre-trial
sanctions. Id.; see PA. R. Civ. P. 4019, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987).
87. 385 Pa. Super. 172, 560 A.2d 222 (1989).
88. Id. at 181, 560 A.2d at 226-27. In this case, Mr. and Mrs. Kukowski
brought a negligence action against Matt Slap Chevrolet, Inc. for injuries sus-
tained while driving their car from the dealership lot. Id. at 174, 560 A.2d at
223-24. In deciding whether to award delay damages to the Kukowskis, the trial
court relied upon Craig. Id. at 180, 560 A.2d at 226.
89. Id. at 174, 181, 560 A.2d at 224, 227. The trial court also noted that
during discovery Mr. Kukowski had requested a continuance for the deposition
of his expert witness, and Mrs. Kukowski had postponed her own deposition. Id.
at 181, 560 A.2d at 227. Furthermore, Mrs. Kukowski had been uncooperative
in releasing employment records requested by defense counsel. Id.
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perior court reversed, stating that revised Rule 238 bars delay damages
only if "plaintiff caused a delay of trial.. . [therefore], the trial court's
emphasis on the reasonableness of Sophie Kukowski's settlement de-
mands, while relevant under the Craig decision, is misplaced in light of
the provisions of the new Rule 238."9o
The reason that the Pennsylvania Superior Court has refused to
take into account the extent of the plaintiff's settlement demands is two-
fold. First, the new Rule focuses only on whether the defendant has
made a reasonable offer, and this is not contingent upon whether the
plaintiff has set forth a reasonable demand. 9 ' Second, while the plain-
tiff's failure to make a more conservative demand may prolong settle-
ment, it is not considered to be a factor which causes the delay of trial.9 2
90. Id.; see also Schrock v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 386 Pa. Super.
215, 218, 562 A.2d 875, 876 (1989) (delay damages awarded despite lowest set-
tlement demand of $50,000 and verdict of only $25,000). For a discussion of
the applicability of new Rule 238 in cases pending on appeal on the Rule's effec-
tive date, see infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
91. Schrock, 386 Pa. Super. at 218-19, 562 A.2d at 876; Modrick v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 383 Pa. Super. 498, 557 A.2d 363 (1989), overruled on other grounds,
King v. SEPTA, 383 Pa. Super. 420, 557 A.2d 11 (1989) (en banc). The Modrick
court explained this rationale as follows:
The imposition of a requirement that a plaintiff make a settlement de-
mand upon a tortfeasor as a condition precedent to the latter's obliga-
tion to make a reasonable offer in writing and that the failure to make
such demand would preclude an award of delay damages or operate as
a factor in mitigation of an award would run contrary to the twin pur-
poses of new Rule 238 which are to alleviate delay in the courts and to
encourage tortfeasors to settle meritorious claims expeditiously.
Id. at 506, 557 A.2d at 367.
92. Schrock, 386 Pa. Super. at 219, 562 A.2d at 876. The facts in Miller v.
Wise Business Forms, 381 Pa. Super. 236, 553 A.2d 443 (1989) (en banc), illus-
trate how this interpretation of the new Rule can be unfair to defendants. In this
case, the plaintiff was a laborer for a general contractor. Id. at 237, 553 A.2d at
444. In December 1983, while repairing the defendant's (Wise's) building, the
plaintiff crushed his right foot. Id. at 237-38, 553 A.2d at 444. On October 19,
1984, plaintiff instituted an action against Wise. Id. Thereafter, on three differ-
ent occasions, Wise asked the plaintiff to submit a settlement demand, but the
plaintiff failed to come up with a meaningful response. Id. Finally, on August
27, 1986, the plaintiff submitted a demand for $750,000. Id. Wise responded
on October 20, 1986, the trial date, with a written offer for $25,000, which plain-
tiff rejected. Id. The jury entered a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of
$195,000. Id.
Relying on Craig, the trial court denied plaintiff's petition for delay dam-
ages. Id. at 240, 553 A.2d 445. The court focused on the existence of "mitigat-
ing factors" which should be considered before awarding delay damages. Id. In
this case, the defendant was unable to formulate an earlier offer due to the plain-
tiff's delay in submitting a reasonable demand. Id. The trial court reasoned that
the plaintiff's conduct was a "mitigating factor" in the delay. Id. Therefore, the
court concluded that it would be unjust to penalize the defendant under such
circumstances. Id. at 242, 553 A.2d at 446. The superior court found these
"mitigating factors" to be irrelevant under new Rule 238. Id. at 241-42, 553
A.2d at 446. As a result, the superior court vacated the judgment and remanded
the proceeding to the trial court for an assessment of delay damages under the
new Rule. Id. at 242, 553 A.2d at 446.
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It appears that under Craig a trial court could consider whether the
plaintiff made a reasonable and timely settlement demand in determin-
ing whether to award delay damages.9 3 However, under revised Rule
238, the superior court has made it clear that the plaintiff's conduct dur-
ing settlement will not be a mitigating factor. 94 As a result, the new
Rule is still one-sided in its punishment, as plaintiffs are not subject to
sanctions for acting unreasonably. 95 In President Judge Cirillo's opin-
ion, the Rule "remains fundamentally unfair in the context of settlement
negotiations . . . [because] the burden of settlement rests upon the
shoulders of the defendant." '9 6
Despite criticism of the new Rule, it does contain some provisions
favorable to defendants. For example, under the new Rule, delay dam-
ages will not begin to run until one year after the date the complaint is
served upon the defendant. 9 7 Therefore, a defendant will now have one
year to evaluate the merits of the case and prepare an appropriate settle-
ment offer without having delay damages imposed. 9 8 Due to this one-
year grace period, plaintiffs will no longer be able to maximize the award
of delay damages by waiting until the last minute to file their com-
93. For a discussion of the Kukowski trial court's application of Craig, see
supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Miller trial
court's application of Craig, see supra note 86. But see Schrock, 386 Pa. Super. at
223, 562 A.2d at 883 (1989) (Cirillo, Pres. J., dissenting) (Craig court did not
address effect of delays based on failure to reach settlement).
94. For a discussion of the superior court's interpretation of the new Rule,
see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
95. For a discussion of this similar criticism of former Rule 238 by Justice
Roberts, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
96. Schrock, 386 Pa. Super. at 231, 233, 562 A.2d at 883-84 (Cirillo, Pres. J.,
dissenting). Judge Cirillo noted that a settlement agreement requires the coop-
eration of both parties. Id. at 233, 562 A.2d at 884 (Cirillo, Pres. J., dissenting).
Therefore, a plaintiff who submits an unreasonable demand is at least partially
responsible for the case going to trial. Id. at 234, 562 A.2d at 884 (Cirillo, Pres.
J., dissenting). In this situation, it is the plaintiff's "profit motive" that prevents
full compensation at settlement, yet only the defendant is penalized. Id. (Cirillo,
Pres.J., dissenting). In his opinion, a court must consider the parties' respective
fault during settlement discussions before it can assess damages against a de-
fendant for all trial delay. Id. at 235-36, 562 A.2d at 885 (Cirillo, Pres. J., dis-
senting). A defendant should only be punished if it is determined that he
delayed settlement because of a desire to obtain greater profits. Id. at 236, 562
A.2d at 885 (Cirillo, Pres. J., dissenting). If a court fails to consider the defend-
ant's conduct during settlement it takes the risk of "mandating settlement in
situations where settlement should perhaps not take place ... punishing defend-
ants for attempting to litigate their cases, and, in some instances .. .punishing
them for being unable to make an acceptable settlement offer." Id. (Cirillo,
Pres. J., dissenting).
97. Rule 238(a)(2)(ii) applies to actions commenced on or after August 1,
1989. Actions filed before August 1, 1989 are governed by Rule 238(a)(2)(i).
For the relevant text of Rule 238(a)(2), see supra note 2.
98. PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. Co Ns. STAT. ANN. explanatory comment at 10
(Purdon Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 35: p. 457
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss2/6
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
plaints.9 9 Consequently, defendants will no longer be penalized by this
conduct which is beyond their control.10 0
In addition, under the revised Rule, defendants are only required to
keep their settlement offers open for either ninety days or until com-
mencement of the trial, whichever is first.' 0 ' This is intended to provide
an incentive for plaintiffs to settle cases earlier.' 0 2 Under the old Rule,
there was no incentive for plaintiffs to settle early because defendants
were required to keep their offers open until the trial began.' 0 3 The
new ninety-day period is intended to provide a reasonable amount of
time for plaintiffs to review and to decide whether to accept an offer.' 0 4
One technical issue the Pennsylvania courts have had to contend
with is whether new Rule 238 should be applied in cases pending on
appeal on November 7, 1988, which was the Rule's effective date. Sub-
section (0 of the Rule states that it "shall apply to actions pending on or
after the effective date of this rule in which damages for delay have not
been determined."' 0 5 The superior court has interpreted "deter-
mined" in subsection (f) to mean "finally determined"; therefore, the
Rule must be applied in all cases that are pending on appeal as of No-
vember 7, 1988.106
99. For a discussion of Justice Robert's dissent addressing this point, see
supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
101. For the relevant text of Rule 238(b)(1)(ii), see supra note 2.
102. PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. explanatory comment at
10 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
103. For the relevant text of former Rule 238(e), see supra note 4.
104. PA. R. Civ. P. 238, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. explanatory comment at
10 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
105. Pa. R. Civ. P. 238(0, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. According to the ex-
planatory comment:
The purpose of this provision is to indicate that the rule applies to
pending as well as future actions but not to pending actions in which
the damages for delay have been determined under the provisions and
procedures of the Craig case. Once damages for delay have been deter-
mined under Craig, those proceedings are final and are not to be re-
opened under this rule.
Id. explanatory comment at 11.
106. See Miller v. Wise Business Forms, 381 Pa. Super. 236, 241, 553 A.2d
443, 446 (1989) (en banc) (citing Ceresini v. Valley View Trailer Park, 380 Pa.
Super. 416, 418-19, 552 A.2d 258, 259 (1988) (en banc), overruled on other
grounds, King v. SEPTA, 383 Pa. Super. 420, 557 A.2d 11 (1989) (en banc)); see
also Staats v. Noll, 381 Pa. Super. 162, 164-65, 553 A.2d 85, 86 (1989) (quoting
Ceresini). But see Slater v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 383 Pa. Super. 509, 517, 557
A.2d 368, 372 (1989) (majority questions application of new Rule 238 in cases
pending on appeal in view of explanatory comment to Rule); Ceresini, 380 Pa.
Super. at 421-22, 552 A.2d at 260-61 (Popovich, J., dissenting) (new Rule 238
should not be applied where trial court determined delay damages under Craig);
Knudsen v. Delaware County Regional Water Quality Control Auth., 121 Pa.
Commw. 549, 554-55 n.3, 551 A.2d, 358, 360 n.3 (1988) (court refused to re-
mand for application of new Rule 238 where trial court awarded delay damages
under Craig).
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Although the new Rule will be applied in all these pending appeals,
in only certain cases will the superior court remand to the trial court for
a recalculation of damages in accordance with the new Rule. For exam-
ple, if a plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of delay damages, and it
is determined that the plaintiff would be entitled to such damages under
the new Rule, the superior court will reverse the judgment and remand
the case to the trial court for an assessment of damages under the new
Rule. 10 7 However, in King v. SEPTA 108 the court held that in a case
where (1) a defendant appeals an award of delay damages which would
be upheld under the new Rule and (2) the plaintiff has not challenged
the amount of damages awarded, the court will merely affirm the award
without remanding the case for a recalculation. 10 9
Under revised Rule 238 there is a different formula for calculating
delay damages."I 0 In the King court's opinion, where an award of delay
damages is proper, and the plaintiff has not filed a separate appeal"'I
challenging the computation of damages, there is no need to remand the
case. Judge Cavanaugh, in his dissent, stated that he fails to understand
the majority's rationale for applying the new Rule in some cases, but not
others." 2 Judge Cavanaugh stated that "[i]f we are correct that the re-
vised Rule 238 applies to cases where the issue has been preserved on
107. See Miller v. Wise Business Forms, 381 Pa. Super. 236, 553 A.2d 443
(1989)(en banc); Staats v. Noll, 381 Pa. Super. 162, 553 A.2d 85 (1989).
108. 383 Pa. Super. 420, 557 A.2d 11 (1989) (en banc).
109. Id. at 425-26, 557 A.2d at 13; see also Snelsire v. Moxon, 384 Pa. Super.
85, 90, 557 A.2d 785, 787-88 (1989). In King the defendant argued that the trial
court's award of delay damages was improper because the defendant did not
cause the delay. King, 383 Pa. Super. at 423, 557 A.2d at 13. However, the
superior court rejected this argument because, under the new Rule, the only way
a defendant can prevent delay damages is by either submitting a reasonable set-
tlement offer or by proving that the plaintiff caused the delay. Id. at 424, 557
A.2d at 13. Since the defendant failed to do either, the award of damages was
appropriate. According to the court, since (1) the defendant had no claim for
relief under new Rule 238 and (2) the plaintiff did not challenge the amount of
damages awarded, there was no need to remand the case to the trial court. Id. at
425, 557 A.2d at 13.
110. New Rule 238 provides for a floating rate of interest in contrast to the
fixed 10%o rate of interest under the prior Rule. For the relevant text of new
Rule 238(a)(3), see supra note 2, and for the relevant text of former Rule
238(a)(1), see supra note 4.
111. King, 383 Pa. Super. at 425, 557 A.2d at 13 (citing Arcidiacono v.
Timeless Towns of the Americas, Inc., 363 Pa. Super. 528, 531 n.2, 526 A.2d
804, 806 n.2 (1987) (appellee who fails to file cross-appeal cannot argue issues
not raised by appellant)). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Cavanaugh stated
that the holding in Arcidiacono was inapposite because in the present case the sole
issue on appeal was the propriety of the entire delay damage award; therefore,
the plaintiff would not be raising a new issue by challenging the amount of dam-
ages. Id. at 427, 557 A.2d at 14 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 428, 557 A.2d at 14-15 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting). Judge Cava-
naugh believed that the majority opinion "works an unfair economic hardship to
plaintiffs who have not filed meaningless cross appeals." Id. at 429, 557 A.2d at
15 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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appeal, then there is no reason to emasculate the rule and apply it only
in part." 113
IV. CONCLUSION
Revised Rule 238 is intended to treat defendants more fairly than
they had been under the former Rule. In some ways this goal has been
achieved. Under the new Rule, defendants will have an opportunity to
be heard before delay damages will be imposed, and defendants will no
longer be penalized for delays caused by plaintiffs. In addition, defend-
ants will have one year to assess the merits of a case before delay dam-
ages will start running. On the other hand, defendants will still be
punished for delays which are beyond their control, such as the delays
caused by the backlog of cases in the Pennsylvania courts. Furthermore,
although defendants are subject to sanctions for not acting "reason-
ably," there are no similar sanctions for plaintiffs who act unreasonably.
As a result, revised Rule 238 only partially resolves the problems that
existed under the former Rule.
Paula T. Calhoun
113. Id. at 428, 557 A.2d at 15 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting). Judge Cava-
naugh also noted that the majority opinion conflicted with its holding in Modrick
where, absent plaintffs cross appeal, the court upheld an award of delay dam-
ages but remanded for a recomputation in light of the new rule. Id.
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